MEMORANDUM

To: Members, Governing Board, California Institute for Regenerative Medicine

From: Robert N. Klein and Art Torres

Date: June 30, 2009

Re: Little Hoover Commission Report on CIRM

The Little Hoover Commission issued its report on CIRM on Friday. The report covers three distinct categories of recommendations: (1) modifications to Proposition 71 that would require a new ballot measure; (2) policy changes that CIRM could implement on its own; and (3) modifications to Proposition 71 that would require legislative intervention. These three categories and the recommendations they encompass are set forth below:

**Modifications that Would Require a New Ballot Measure**

(1) reduce the size of the Board from 29 to 15;

(2) reduce board members' terms to 4 years, after the terms of current members expire;

(3) concentrate appointment authority in the Governor by authorizing the Governor to appoint 11 of 15 members (2 members would be appointed by the Legislature and 2 members would be appointed by the President of UC) with immediate vulnerability to the 2010 election;

(4) eliminate the Chair's statutory responsibilities; and

(5) authorize the Board to select the chair and vice chair from among the 15 members.

**Policy Changes that CIRM Could Implement**

(6) modify the pre-application review process;

(7) identify all of the applicants in connection with an RFA on a trial basis;

(8) poll peer reviewers to determine whether they would resign if they were required to publicly disclose their financial interests;

(9) amend the minutes of board meetings to disclose vote tallies and recusals;

(10) add a provision to the board bylaws authorizing removal of members for cause; and
(11) adopt a succession plan for leadership and a transition plan for the eventual expiration of bond funding.

**Modification that Would Require Legislative Intervention**

(12) eliminate the 50 employee cap;

(13) eliminate the 15-scientist cap on the GWG (CIRM currently has approximately 150 scientific members and alternates available to serve on peer review, so the cap has not presented a problem – for example, for the tools and technologies applications, we ran two concurrent peer review sessions);

(14) require the Citizens’ Financial Accountability Oversight Committee (CFAOC), which was created by Prop. 71 and which is chaired by the Controller, to conduct a performance audit (the CFAOC already conducts a review of CIRM’s financial audit, and at its most recent meeting, conducted a quasi-performance review of CIRM);

As the attached analysis demonstrates (see legal opinions from Remcho, Johansen & Purcell and Nielsen, Merksamer), recommendations (1) through (5), above, would require a new ballot measure because they would undermine, rather than further, the intent of the seven million California voters who approved Proposition 71. As a result, recommendations (1) through (5), if adopted, would be an unconstitutional amendment of Prop. 71. As members of the Board, we took an oath to uphold Proposition 71 and could not support these proposed changes.

The legal analysis does not address recommendations (6) through (14), above. Recommendations (6) through (11) are policy issues that could be addressed by the Board and implemented by CIRM. Recommendations (12) through (14) would require legislative intervention. Because they would not undermine the intent of the voters, however, the Legislature could adopt them without proposing a new ballot measure.

We have also attached a letter that we, along with Sherry Lansing, Duane Roth, and Alan Trounson, sent to the Little Hoover Commission before the report was issued. In addition to this communication, last Tuesday, we met with Daniel Hancock, the Chairman of the LHC and Loren Kaye, the Chairman of the LHC Subcommittee on CIRM. We presented them with legal opinions from the Remcho firm and Nielsen Merksamer demonstrating the constitutional problems created by recommendations (1) through (5) and we shared our concerns regarding the implementation problems they would create if adopted. Although the LHC responded to our concerns regarding the immediate replacement of the Board by recommending that the restructuring of the Board occur after the current members’ terms expire, they have not addressed the other problems that would ensue if their recommendations were adopted. For example, currently, 12 patient advocates are available to participate on the working groups (GWG -- 7 patient advocates; SWG -- 5 patient advocates; FWG -- 6 patient advocates) and they are already stretched to the limits. The LHC would reduce the number of patient advocates to five,
without addressing the disparity this would create or the work load imposed on the patient advocates. In addition, while the LHC has acknowledged the legal concerns we raised, they have not resolved them and have instead left that issue to the Legislature.

Nonetheless, the LHC has made other recommendations that deserve our thoughtful consideration. We intend to schedule a meeting of the Legislative Subcommittee to study recommendations (6) through (11) to determine how CIRM could implement them. In addition, we plan to ask the Subcommittee to consider whether to recommend that the Board support legislative action on recommendations (12) through (14). We look forward to discussing these items with you at a future meeting.

Attachments
MEMORANDUM

VIA EMAIL

To: Daniel W. Hancock, Chairman, Little Hoover Commission
    Members, Little Hoover Commission

From: James C. Harrison and Kari Krogseng

Date: June 23, 2009

Re: Proposed Recommendations Regarding CIRM (Our File No.: 2297-0)

INTRODUCTION

We represent the California Institute for Regenerative Medicine (“CIRM”). CIRM has asked us to analyze whether the Little Hoover Commission staff’s proposed changes to CIRM’s structure and operations are consistent with the requirement that Proposition 71 may only be amended to further its purposes. Article II, section 10(c) of the California Constitution prohibits the Legislature from amending an initiative unless the initiative expressly permits legislative amendment. Proposition 71 allows the Legislature to amend the statutory provisions of the act, but only to enhance CIRM’s ability to further the purposes of its grant and loan programs. The Little Hoover Commission staff’s proposed recommendations would, among other things, drastically restructure CIRM’s governance by reducing the size of the board and the terms of board members, concentrating appointment power in a single constitutional officer and transferring virtually all of the Chair’s statutory duties to the President. As explained below, these proposed changes do not further Proposition 71’s purposes, and could only be accomplished by another ballot measure.

ANALYSIS

A. The Precious Right of Initiative

   Article IV, section 1 of the California Constitution vests the legislative power of the state in the Legislature, “but the people reserve[d] to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum” in order “‘to tear through the exasperating tangle of the traditional legislative
procedure and strike directly toward the desired end.”” (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1; Cal. Const., art. II, § 8; Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 228-229, quoting Key & Crouch, The Initiative and the Referendum in California (1939) p. 435.) The power of initiative is “one of the most precious rights of our democratic process,” and it is the “solemn duty [of the courts] to jealously guard the precious initiative power.”” (Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 591, citation omitted; California Family Bioethics Council v. California Institute for Regenerative Medicine (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1338, citation omitted.) “[I]t has long been our judicial policy to apply a liberal construction to this power wherever it is challenged in order that the right be not improperly annulled.”” (DeVita v. County of Napa (1995) 9 Cal.4th 763, 776, quoting Associated Home Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d at 591.)

To protect this right, article II, section 10(c) of the California Constitution prohibits the Legislature from amending an initiative, except by placing another initiative on the ballot, unless the measure expressly permits amendment:

[The Legislature] may amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute that becomes effective only when approved by the electors unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without their approval.

“The constitutional limitation on the Legislature’s power to amend initiative statutes is designed to ‘protect the people’s initiative powers by precluding the Legislature from undoing what the people have done, without the electorate’s consent.’” (Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v. Garamendi (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1364, citation omitted.) As the California Supreme Court has recognized, the voters’ power to decide whether the Legislature may amend or repeal initiative statutes “is absolute and includes the power to enable legislative amendment subject to conditions attached by the voters.”” (Amwest Surety Ins. Co v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243, 1251, citation omitted, emphasis in original.) Furthermore, “[a]ny doubts should be resolved in favor of the initiative and referendum power, and amendments which may conflict with the subject matter of initiative measures must be accomplished by popular vote, as opposed to legislatively enacted ordinance, where the original initiative does not provide otherwise.”” (In re Estate of Claeyssens (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 465, 470, citations omitted, emphasis in original.)

Courts “shall uphold the validity of [a legislative amendment to an initiative] if, by any reasonable construction, it can be said that the statute furthers the purposes of [the initiative].”” (Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at 1256.) In determining the initiative’s purpose, courts “are guided by, but are not limited to, the general statement of purpose found in the initiative.”” (Id. at 1257.) “[E]vidence of [an initiative’s] purpose may [also] be drawn from many sources, including the historical context of the amendment, and the ballot arguments favoring the measure.”” (Id. at 1256, citation omitted.) Courts also rely on the plain meaning of the initiative’s text (Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at 1370),

In *Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson*, 11 Cal.4th 1243, the California Supreme Court concluded that a legislative amendment of Proposition 103, which among other things rolled back insurance rates in California and required the Insurance Commissioner to approve future rate increases, was invalid because it did not further the purposes of the measure. Proposition 103, by its plain terms, “‘applied to all insurance on risk or on operations in this state.’” (*Id.* at 1248, quoting Prop. 103, Ins. Code § 1851.) Proposition 103 also prohibited the Legislature from amending it, “‘except to further its purposes by a statute passed in each house by roll call vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the membership concurring.’” (*Id.* at 1249, quoting Prop. 103, § 8(b).) Notwithstanding these provisions, the Legislature passed a bill to exempt surety insurance from the rate rollback and approval requirements of Proposition 103. The Legislature claimed that the bill furthered the purposes of Proposition 103 by “‘clarifying the applicability of the proposition to surety insurance.’” (*Id.* at 1260, quoting Stats. 1990, ch. 562, § 2.) The Court rejected the argument, concluding that the bill represented “an alteration rather than a clarification of the initiative.” (*Id.*)

[It was clear that the provisions of Proposition 103 applied to surety insurance. [The bill], therefore, did not further the purposes of Proposition 103 by clarifying whether the proposition applied to surety insurance; instead it altered its terms in a significant respect. (*Id.* at 1261.)

The Court also rejected an argument advanced by Amwest, an insurance company that challenged Proposition 103. Amwest argued that the bill furthered the purposes of Proposition 103 by reducing the burden on the Insurance Commissioner, who would otherwise have to approve any increase in rates filed by a surety insurer. Noting that a principal purpose of Proposition 103 was to increase the duties of the Commissioner, the Court reasoned that “[a]ttempting to lessen this increase in the regulatory burden on the commissioner by reducing the scope of the initiative, rather than by providing the commissioner with sufficient additional staff and other resources, would seem to run counter to the purpose of Proposition 103.” (*Id.* at 1263.)
Although the Court recognized the deference owed to the Legislature (id. at 1253), it held that the bill was invalid because it did not further the purposes of Proposition 103:

In so holding, we do not question the wisdom of the Legislature in enacting [the bill]. [Citation.] The question before us is not whether exempting surety insurance from some of the provisions of Proposition 103 furthers the public good, but rather whether doing so furthers the purposes of Proposition 103. We hold that it does not. Because Proposition 103 expressly permits its provisions to be amended without voter approval, but only when to do so would further the purposes of the initiative, [the bill] is invalid.

(Id. at 1265.)

The Legislature also failed in two other attempts to amend Proposition 103. (Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v. Garamendi (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1354; Proposition 103 Enforcement Project v. Quackenbush (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1478 [declaring “constitutionally invalid” a bill that would have permitted insurers to reduce the amount of the insurance rollback required under Proposition 103 by the amount of commissions paid]). Most recently, the Second District Court of Appeal struck down a bill that would have permitted insurers to consider whether a driver was previously insured in determining whether the driver was eligible for a Good Driver discount. The court noted that one of the fundamental purposes of Proposition 103 was to prohibit discrimination against uninsured drivers and to promote available and affordable insurance so that uninsured drivers could become insured. (Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at 1366.) The court concluded that the bill did not further the purposes of Proposition 103 because it “authorizes a discount only to drivers with a history of continuous, or virtually continuous, insurance coverage.” (Id. at 1369-1370.) “By specifically focusing on eliminating discrimination against the previously uninsured . . ., the voters made clear that a fundamental purpose of Proposition 103 is to include and extend the protections of Proposition 103 in particular to, and to prohibit discrimination against, the previously uninsured.” (Id. at 1370.)

The court also found that the bill conflicted with the voters’ delegation of rule-making authority to the Insurance Commissioner, who had exercised that authority by adopting a regulation to implement the Good Driver discount. “In enacting [the bill], the Legislature sought to override the Insurance Commissioner’s authority to set rates and premiums for automobile insurance.” (Id. at 1372.) Citing the need for “‘specialized agency fact-finding and expertise,’” the court found that Proposition 103 vested the Insurance Commission, rather than the
Legislature, with the authority to set rates. *(Id., quoting Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 377, 397.)*¹

The Legislature cannot simply in the guise of amending Proposition 103 undercut and undermine a fundamental purpose of Proposition 103, even while professing that the amendment “furthers” Proposition 103. The power of the Legislature may be “practically absolute,” but that power must yield when the limitation of the Legislature’s authority clearly inhibits its action.

*(Id. at 1371, citation omitted.)*

Notably, the court cited with approval the appellant’s concession that “‘[a] valid amendment to Proposition 103 must not only further its purposes in general, but it cannot do violence to specific provisions of Proposition 103. So even if an amendment can be shown to further its purposes, it may nonetheless be invalid if it violates a specific primary mandate.’” *(Id. at 1370, quoting appellant.)* The court then found that the proposed amendment “does violate this primary mandate of Proposition 103 and, accordingly, it cannot ‘reasonably’ be found to further the purposes of Proposition 103.” *(Id.)*

**B. Application to Proposition 71**

Unlike many ballot measures, Proposition 71 expressly permits the Legislature to amend its statutory provisions (except for the Bond Act). To protect the will of the voters, however, Proposition 71 only permits amendments that enhance CIRM’s ability to achieve its mission:

The statutory provisions of this measure, except the bond provisions, may be amended to enhance the ability of the institute to further the purposes of the grant and loan programs created by the measure . . . .

*(Prop. 71, § 8.)*

¹ Likewise, another panel of the Second District Court of Appeal noted that an amendment that essentially removed ratemaking discretion from the Insurance Commissioner by requiring that he or she follow a certain formula contradicted Proposition 103’s purpose of making the Insurance Commissioner “an elected rather than appointed position, thus making the Commissioner responsive to the voters, not the Legislature.” *(Proposition 103 Enforcement Project, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at 1486-1487.)*
This provision, which restricts the Legislature’s ability to amend Proposition 71, mirrors one of the initiative’s primary purposes as stated in section 2(a) of the constitutional portion of the initiative: “To make grants and loans for stem cell research, for research facilities, and for other vital research opportunities . . . .” (Cal. Const., art. XXXV, §2(a).) Indeed, “[t]he overarching subject of Proposition 71 is stem cell research and funding.” (California Family Bioethics Council, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 1342, quoting trial court.)

For the purposes of article II, section 10(c), which prohibits the Legislature from amending an initiative unless the initiative so permits, amendments include “. . . any change of the scope or effect of an existing statute, whether by addition, omission, or substitution of provisions . . . .” (Franchise Tax Bd. v. Cory (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 772, 776, quoting Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1972) § 22.01, p. 105.) Each of the Little Hoover Commission’s proposed changes listed below would directly amend Proposition 71’s provisions and undermine the voters’ intent, thus requiring another ballot measure under article II, section 10(c) and section 8 of Proposition 71:

- Reduce the size of the board from 29 members to 15 members;
- Add four “independent” members, either scientists who are not affiliated with grant applicants or citizens;
- Reduce board members’ terms from six or eight years to four years;
- Authorize: (a) the Governor to appoint 11 of the 15 members, (b) the University of California to appoint two members; and (c) the Legislature to appoint two members, and thus eliminate appointments by specified University of California chancellors, the Lieutenant Governor, the Treasurer, and the Controller;  
- Reduce the quorum threshold for ICOC decisions regarding grants from 65% to 50%;  
- Eliminate the Chair’s statutory duties and clarify that the President oversees all day-to-day operations;  
- Elect the Chair and Vice-Chair from among the 15 members as opposed to electing them from outside the board;  
- Preclude the Chair and Vice-Chair from receiving salaries; and  
- Reduce the threshold for legislative amendment of Proposition 71 from 70% to a majority vote.
1. **Restructuring the Board Would Not Further the Purposes of Proposition 71**

The Commission’s staff proposes a drastic restructuring of the ICOC and CIRM. They would reduce the size of the Board from 29 to 15 members, thereby eliminating nearly half of the scientific, commercial, and patient advocacy experts who currently serve on the Board. (See Health & Saf. Code, § 125290(a).) In addition to reducing the number of experts on the Board, the Commission would also add four “independent” board members who are either unaffiliated scientists or citizens.

These proposals fly in the face of the voters’ intent. Proposition 71’s statement of purpose explicitly states that the initiative would “[c]reate an Independent Citizen’s Oversight Committee composed of representatives of the University of California campuses with medical schools; other California universities and California medical research institutions; California disease advocacy groups; and California experts in the development of medical therapies.” (Prop. 71, § 3.) The plain text of the initiative clarifies how the voters intended to construct the Board. (Health & Saf. Code, § 125290.20(a); Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at 1370 [determining purpose of initiative from plain meaning of initiative’s text].) The analysis of Proposition 71 by the Legislative Analyst also states that “[t]he institute would be governed by a 29-member Independent Citizen’s Oversight Committee (ICOC), comprised of representatives of specified UC campuses, another public or private California university, nonprofit academic and medical research institutions, companies with expertise in developing medical therapies, and disease research advocacy groups,” and the argument in favor of Proposition 71 reiterated that “[r]esearch grants will be allocated by an Independent Citizen’s Oversight Committee, guided by medical experts, representatives of disease groups, and financial experts.” (Prop. 71, legislative analysis; argument in favor of Prop. 71.)

The First District Court of Appeal, which upheld Proposition 71 against a variety of constitutional challenges, noted that the initiative contains “stringent qualifications for appointment designed to ensure that all members possess appropriate experience and expertise and that persons knowledgeable in the various disease groups that may benefit from the research are represented.” (California Family Bioethics Council, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 1332-1333.) It also noted that Proposition 71 “imposes rigorous qualifications for those who may serve on the ICOC and its working groups. The obvious intent is to require that those responsible for participating in the decisionmaking process and allocating research funds be knowledgeable in the applicable fields of science and medicine.” (Id. at 1344.) These findings make clear that the voters’ intent was to utilize a large number of experts as board members, not uninvolved scientists or citizens. “In approving Proposition 71 the voters determined that grants and loans should be awarded by the experts who comprise the ICOC, chosen in the manner specified in the Act.” (Id. at 1358, emphasis added.) In response to an argument that Health and Safety Code section 125290.30 should be reconciled with the state’s more general conflict of interest laws, the court found that this course of action “would both rewrite the Act and defeat the very purpose of the qualifications for appointment to the ICOC.” (Id. at 1367.) “By approving Proposition
71 the voters have determined that the advantages of permitting particularly knowledgeable persons to decide which research projects to fund outweigh any concerns that these decisions may be influenced by the personal or professional interests of those members, so long as the members do not participate in any decision to award grants to themselves or their employer.” (Id. at 1368.)

The fact that the Commission’s proposal would maintain representation from universities, research institutions, the biotechnology sector, and patient advocacy organizations does not change this analysis. The size of the Board, which is similar to both the UC Regents (26 members) and the Judicial Council (28 members), was intended to ensure not only that CIRM has the expertise necessary to encompass the entire scientific and medical research pipeline from discovery to clinical application, but also to provide a diversity of viewpoints that enriches debates and improves outcomes. The proposal to reshape the Board puts at risk the quality of debate and decisions. It would reduce the expertise and diversity of viewpoints on the Board and it is at odds with the voters’ express intent that CIRM be governed by a large board comprised of individuals with diverse views and expertise.

Finally, the Commission proposes to reduce board members’ terms from six or eight years to four years. (See Health & Saf. Code, § 125290.20(c)(1).) As its name implies, the Board was designed to be “independent.” By providing for six and eight year terms, the voters sought to protect the Board’s scientific mission and also provide stability for CIRM to pursue its ambitious mandate. Like the proposal to reduce the size of the Board, the proposal to reduce terms would not further the intent of the voters; it would frustrate it.

2. **Shifting Appointment Authority Would Not Further the Purposes of Proposition 71**

The proposed changes would eliminate the power of the Lieutenant Governor, the Controller, and the Treasurer to make appointments to the ICOC board and reduce the appointment authority of UC Chancellors. (See Health & Saf. Code, § 125290.20(a).) It would concentrate the appointing power in the hands of the Governor, who would appoint 11 of the 15 board members. This amendment would thus negate the voter’s intent to disperse and balance the appointment authority among four constitutional officers, the Legislature, and the Chancellors of the UC campuses with medical schools, in order to protect the Board’s scientific mission. The Legislative Analyst’s analysis of the initiative specifically noted that “[t]he Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Treasurer, Controller, Speaker of the Assembly, President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and certain UC campus Chancellors would make the appointments to the ICOC.” (Prop. 71, legislative analysis.) One can well imagine that the voter’s intent to support stem cell research through the grant and loan program could be easily defeated if a governor opposed to stem cell research obtained nearly all the appointment authority — particularly if the length of board members’ terms were reduced. Such a scenario runs contrary to the historical context behind the voter’s approval of Proposition 71, which arose out of, as the argument in favor of Proposition 71 stated, “political squabbling” that “severely limited funding for the most
promising areas of stem cell research.” (Argument in favor of Prop. 71.) The voters created a number of protections to ensure that CIRM would be insulated from this type of political influence, and concentrating appointment authority in the hands of one political officer runs contrary to that intent.

3. **Reducing the Quorum Requirement Would Not Further the Purposes of Proposition 71**

Proposition 71 expressly defines a “quorum” to be 65% of those members of the governing board who are eligible to vote. (Health & Saf. Code, § 125292.10(s).) This requirement, like the dispersal of appointment authority and the length of members’ terms, serves to protect the agency from being captured by a minority. Furthermore, like the size of the board, the quorum requirement ensures that a diversity of views will be represented in the Board’s decisions and a high probability that the quorum will be comprised of reasonable representation from each of the appointment categories. The proposal to reduce the quorum from 65% to 50% would undermine this design and the voters’ intent, as expressed by the plain language of Proposition 71.

4. **Shifting the Chair’s Duties to the President Would Not Further the Purposes of Proposition 71**

By the plain language of Proposition 71, the voters intended to create an executive chair who would provide financial leadership and a president who would provide scientific leadership. (Health & Saf. Code, § 125290.20(a)(6).) The Little Hoover Commission staff’s proposal would shift nearly all of the Chair’s authority to the President, require that the Chair and Vice Chair be appointed from among the 15 board members, and strip the Chair and Vice Chair of their salaries. Far from enhancing CIRM’s ability to carry out its mission, this proposal would undermine the agency’s ability to function effectively. In *Amwest*, the California Supreme Court determined that a bill that decreased the duties of the Insurance Commissioner did not further the purposes of Proposition 103 because a principal purpose of Proposition 103 was to increase the duties of the Commissioner and “[a]ttempting to lessen this increase in the regulatory burden on the commissioner by reducing the scope of the initiative, rather than by providing the commissioner with sufficient additional staff and other resources, would seem to run counter to the purpose of Proposition 103.” (*Amwest, supra*, 11 Cal.4th at 1263.) Here, Proposition 71 carefully allocated responsibilities for CIRM’s scientific and financial missions to different individuals in order to best support the grant and loan programs. Salaries were provided for the Chair and Vice Chair in order to attract the best talent. An attempt to transfer all duties to the President and to strip the Chair and Vice Chair of salaries “run[s] counter to the purpose of Proposition” 71. It would also do violence to a specific mandate of Proposition 71, and is thus not a valid amendment. (*Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights, supra*, 132 Cal.App.4th at 1370.)
5. **Reducing the Threshold for Legislative Amendment Would Not Further the Purposes of Proposition 71**

Finally, the proposal to reduce the threshold for legislative amendment of Proposition 71 from 70% to a majority vote cannot be accomplished without another ballot measure. (See Prop. 71, § 8.) This provision goes to the core of the voter’s initiative power under section II, section 10(c), and cannot be amended without another ballot measure. The voters’ power to decide whether the Legislature may amend or repeal initiative statutes “‘is absolute and includes the power to enable legislative amendment subject to conditions attached by the voters.’” (Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at 1251, citation omitted, emphasis in original.) Moreover, the voters sought to protect CIRM from political influence in a number of ways, as described above. Section 8’s provision for legislative amendments, but only under certain circumstances, is one mechanism by which the voters sought to protect Proposition 71. Any amendment to Section 8 would run contrary to Proposition 71’s purposes.

**CONCLUSION**

The Little Hoover Commission’s proposals would effect drastic and disruptive changes to CIRM’s governance and operating systems. Such changes run counter to the voters’ intent, and do not further Proposition 71’s purposes. They could, therefore, only be accomplished by another ballot measure.
MEMORANDUM

To: Members, Governing Board, California Institute for Regenerative Medicine

From: Bob Klein, Chairman, Governing Board
       Art Torres, Vice Chair, Governing Board, and Acting Chair, Legislative Subcommittee

Date: August 12, 2009

Re: Little Hoover Commission Report on CIRM

INTRODUCTION

The Legislative Subcommittee met on July 16 and August 6, 2009, to consider the recommendations contained in the Little Hoover Commission’s report on CIRM. (A full copy of the Little Hoover Commission’s report is appended to this memorandum as Attachment A.) The Subcommittee considered reports from Board Counsel and CIRM management, heard comments from staff of the Little Hoover Commission and members of the public, and engaged in a thorough discussion of the Little Hoover Commission’s report. The Legislative Subcommittee also reviewed a letter from Senator Dean Florez, the only member of the Little Hoover Commission who opposed the Commission’s adoption of the report. (A copy of Senator Florez’s letter is appended to this memorandum as Attachment B.) After considering the Little Hoover Commission’s report, Senator Florez’s letter, staff analysis, public comments, and board member discussion, the Legislative Subcommittee approved motions relating to the recommendations made by the Little Hoover Commission. Below, we summarize the Little Hoover Commission’s recommendations, the staff’s analysis, and the positions recommended by the Legislative Subcommittee.

The Little Hoover Commission’s report includes three distinct categories of recommendations: (1) modifications to Proposition 71 that, based on the advice of board counsel, would require a new ballot measure; (2) policy changes that the Little Hoover Commission believes CIRM could implement on its own; and (3) modifications to Proposition 71 that would require legislative intervention:

I. Modifications that Would Require a New Ballot Measure

A. Little Hoover Commission Recommendations

(1) reduce the size of the Board from 29 to 15 (LHC report, p. 17-18; 31-32);

(2) reduce board members’ terms from 8 or 6 years to 4 years, after the terms of current members expire (LHC report, p. 18-19; 32);
(3) concentrate appointment authority in the Governor by authorizing the Governor to appoint 11 of 15 members (2 members would be appointed by the Legislature and 2 members would be appointed by the President of UC) (LHC report, p. 18-19; 33);

(4) eliminate the Chair's statutory responsibilities and transfer them to the President (LHC report, p. 19; 32-33); and

(5) authorize the Board to select the chair and vice chair from among the 15 members (LHC report, p. 21-22; 32-33).

B. Staff Analysis

At the Legislative Subcommittee meeting on July 16, 2009, Board Counsel James Harrison presented his analysis of the Legislature’s authority to implement these changes through legislation, as opposed to a new ballot measure. (Mr. Harrison also prepared a detailed written analysis, which is appended to this memorandum as Attachment C.) Mr. Harrison explained that, under California law, an initiative may only be amended by the voters, unless the measure expressly permits legislative amendment. This limitation was designed to protect the people’s power of initiative by preventing the Legislature from undoing what the people have done without the electorate’s consent. Although Proposition 71 permits the Legislature to amend the law, it restricts this power to amendments that would enhance CIRM’s ability to further the purposes of its grant and loan programs.

The Little Hoover Commission’s recommendations are inconsistent with these limitations, Mr. Harrison explained, because they would contravene the intent of the voters and violate specific primary mandates of Proposition 71:

- The size of the Board was intended to ensure not only that CIRM has the expertise necessary to encompass the entire scientific and medical research pipeline from discovery to clinical application, but also to provide a diversity of viewpoints that enriches debates and improves outcomes. Reducing the size of the board almost by half would interfere with the deliberate design set forth in Proposition 71.

- By providing for six and eight year terms, the voters sought to protect the Board’s scientific mission and also provide stability for CIRM to pursue its ambitious mandate. Limiting board member terms to four years would interfere with the independence and stability of the board.

- The diffusion of appointments among four constitutional officers was also intended to maintain the “independence” of board. Concentrating 11 of 15 appointments in the Governor and authorizing the board, rather than the four constitutional officers, to nominate the Chair and Vice Chair, is inconsistent with the voters’ express intent to create an independent board to oversee CIRM.
The assignment of statutory responsibilities to the Chair reflects the voters’ intent to allocate financial/legal issues and scientific issues, respectively, to individuals with expertise in those fields. (The Chair’s duties, for example, are aligned with the qualifications for Chair prescribed by Proposition 71.) Transferring the chair’s statutory duties to the President would be inconsistent with the deliberate structure established by Proposition 71.

In summary, Board Counsel advised the Subcommittee that these amendments are inconsistent with the voters’ intent and a primary mandate of Prop. 71 – namely the composition and structure of the board. For all of these reasons, Board Counsel concluded that the Legislature would have to place another measure on the ballot to amend these provisions, just as it did with Propositions 10 and 63, which it sought to amend through Proposition 1D and 1E, respectively, in the May 19, 2009 special election. (The voters rejected Propositions 1D and 1E by a substantial margin.)

C. Legislative Subcommittee’s Proposed Position

After considering this analysis, board member discussion, and public comment, the Legislative Subcommittee voted 8-0, with one abstention, to oppose these recommendations on the ground that, based on the advice of counsel, they would require another vote of the people.

LEGISLATIVE SUBCOMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION: Oppose Little Hoover Commission recommendations 1 through 5 based on counsel’s advice that the proposed amendments to Proposition 71 would require another vote of the people.

II. Policy Changes that CIRM Could Implement

A. Little Hoover Commission Recommendations

(6) modify the pre-application review process (LHC report, p. 26-27; 33-34);

(7) identify all of the applicants in connection with an RFA on a trial basis (LHC report, p. 25; 34);

(8) poll peer reviewers to determine whether they would resign if they were required to publicly disclose their financial interests (LHC report, p. 24-25; 34);

(9) amend the minutes of board meetings to disclose vote tallies and recusals (LHC report, p. 25; 39);

(10) add a provision to the board bylaws authorizing removal of members for cause (LHC report, p. 18; 33); and
(11) adopt a succession plan for leadership and a transition plan for the eventual expiration of bond funding (LHC report, p. 35-36).

B. Staff Analysis

At the August 6, 2009, meeting of the Legislative Subcommittee, CIRM President Alan Trounson reported to the Subcommittee regarding CIRM management’s position on items 6 through 8. Board Counsel James Harrison made a presentation regarding items 9 and 10 and Chairman Bob Klein addressed item 11. As was true of the July 16th meeting, staff from the Little Hoover Commission attended the meeting, provided comments, and responded to questions. The staff’s analysis of these items is summarized below:

(6) Modify pre-application review process.

The Little Hoover Commission recommended that CIRM modify its pre-application review process to enhance CIRM’s transparency but offered no suggestions as to how the process should be modified. The ICOC agreed to have a trial period for the pre-application process over three RFAs: Basic Biology I, Disease Team Research Awards and Basic Biology II. This trial period is still in progress and the information collection is incomplete, as is the analysis and evaluation. The results of this experiment will be completed, analyzed and evaluated and presented to the ICOC in December 2009. CIRM staff will provide recommended modifications to the pre-application review process at that time.

Staff Position: CIRM staff believes that this proposal is premature, but will provide recommended modifications to the Board in the future.

(7) Identify all of the applicants in connection with an RFA on a trial basis.

Citing Connecticut, the Little Hoover Commission recommended that CIRM identify, on a trial basis, all applicants for a particular request for applications to enhance CIRM’s transparency. CIRM staff believes very strongly that this is inappropriate – no granting agencies of which they are aware follow this procedure, other than Connecticut. It is not considered a best practice nor is it commonly used. Confidentiality is critical to ensuring the integrity of the peer review process. The names of submitting institutions and individuals, as well as application content and peer evaluations, are kept confidential, except to those involved in the review process, to the extent permitted by law. Disclosure of scientists’ failures in grant competition would have a negative impact on their careers and make them reluctant to propose highly innovative projects that often move the science forward. In addition, CIRM’s plans to expand its partnerships with industry will be compromised by disclosure of unsuccessful applications that could thwart a company’s ability to raise funds.
Staff Position: Because of the importance of confidentiality in the peer review process, CIRM staff does not support this proposal.

(8) Poll peer reviewers to determine whether they would resign if they were required to publicly disclose their financial interests.

Citing previous statements from CIRM that members of the Grants Working Group would resign if they were required to publicly disclose their financial interests, the Little Hoover Commission recommended that CIRM staff conduct an anonymous poll of its peer reviewers to determine whether they would resign if required to file public financial disclosure statements.

To put this request in context, it is important to understand that, under California law, members of an advisory group are not required to complete financial disclosure statements. Thus, CIRM already goes beyond the requirements of state law by requiring members of the Grants Working Group to disclose their financial, professional, and personal interests to CIRM, and CIRM requires recusal in the event of a conflict. Furthermore, pursuant to the legislative enhancements approved by the Board in 2005, CIRM has agreed to make these disclosure statements available to state auditors for review. Indeed, the State Controller has reviewed CIRM’s conflict policies and records and determined that CIRM’s conflict policies are more rigorous than National Institutes of Health requirements and that CIRM had complied with these policies. Thus, there is no evidence that suggests a need for modification of these policies.

However, CIRM staff are prepared to take an informal, anonymous poll of GWG members and alternates attending the next GWG meeting to find out whether they would be willing to continue serving if: (1) the financial disclosure documents that they are currently required to complete were to be made public, or (2) they were required to complete and make public the Form 700. CIRM will disclose the aggregate results of this poll.

Staff Position: CIRM staff endorses the proposal to take an anonymous poll of GWG members.

(9) Amend board minutes to include vote tallies and conflicts.

The Little Hoover Commission recommended that the Governing Board amend the minutes of its meetings to include a tally of votes and recusals on grant applications. CIRM staff is in the process of amending the minutes of Governing Board meetings back to January 1, 2008, to include this information, and we will include this information in the minutes of meetings going forward. This information will be posted on CIRM’s website.

Staff Position: CIRM staff endorses this proposal.
(10) Add a provision to the Board’s Bylaws to permit the removal of a board member for cause.

The Little Hoover Commission recommended that the Governing Board add a provision to the Board’s bylaws providing for the removal of members of the Board for cause. Under Proposition 71, members are appointed to serve fixed terms. (Health & Saf. Code, § 125290.20(c).) In upholding Proposition 71 against a constitutional challenge, the First District Court of Appeal construed this provision to permit removal of members only through a quo warranto action initiated by the Attorney General. (California Family Bioethics Council v. California Institute for Regenerative Medicine (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1354-1355.) The court’s reading of Proposition 71 is consistent with California law, which provides that a member of an appointed body serves at the pleasure of the appointing authority only when the member’s term is not fixed by law. (See Gov. Code, § 1301; Brown v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 52, 55-56.) Because the members of the Governing Board are appointed to serve terms prescribed by law, they are not subject to removal by the appointing authority. (This feature of Proposition 71 is not uncommon; indeed, numerous members of state commissions serve fixed terms, including the members of the Little Hoover Commission.)

Furthermore, Proposition 71 provides no authority for the Board to remove members. Indeed, the inclusion of a removal power in the Board’s bylaws would interfere with the authority of the appointing powers to select the members whom the appointing authority believes are best suited for the position. The Governing Board, therefore, has no power to amend its bylaws to provide for the removal of members of the Board. It is important to note, however, that this limitation would not prevent the Board from requesting that the Attorney General initiate an action to remove a member for cause.

Staff Position: Because the Board does not have the power to adopt a bylaws provision providing for the removal of members, CIRM staff does not support this proposal.

(11) Adopt a succession plan for leadership and a transition plan for the eventual expiration of bond funding.

Chairman Bob Klein explained that he had announced his intention not to seek a second term 18 months before the expiration of his term in order to permit time for the Board to plan for a leadership succession and that a succession plan, including the possibility of a Board search committee which would make recommendations for candidates to the constitutional officers, was under development and would be brought to the Board for consideration. He also explained that the Board had a responsibility to engage in strategic financial planning and that a draft plan would be issued later this year. Chairman Klein explained that there were a number of options for future financing, including the possibility for additional bond authority, which would hinge on CIRM’s performance.
Chairman’s Position: Chairman Klein endorses this proposal.

C. Legislative Subcommittee’s Proposed Position

The Legislative Subcommittee engaged in a substantive discussion of the Little Hoover Commission’s recommendations and staff’s analysis, took public comment, and questioned staff of the Little Hoover Commission. The Legislative Subcommittee then approved, by a unanimous vote, a motion recommending that the Board endorse the staff’s positions on these items, as described above.

LEGISLATIVE SUBCOMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION: The Legislative Subcommittee recommends that the Board support the staff positions, as described above, on Little Hoover Commission recommendations 6 through 11.

III. Modifications that Would Require Legislative Intervention

A. Little Hoover Commission Recommendations

(12) eliminate the 50 employee cap (LHC report, p. 19; 33);

(13) eliminate the 15-scientist cap on the GWG (CIRM currently has approximately 150 scientific members and alternates available to serve on peer review, so the cap has not presented a problem – for example, for the tools and technologies applications, we ran two concurrent peer review sessions) (LHC report, p. 26-27; 33-34); and

(14) require the Citizens’ Financial Accountability Oversight Committee (CFAOC), which was created by Prop. 71 and which is chaired by the Controller, to conduct a performance audit (the CFAOC already conducts a review of CIRM’s financial audit) (LHC report, p. 35).

B. Staff Analysis

CIRM President Alan Trounson reported to the Subcommittee regarding CIRM management’s position on items 12 and 13 and Subcommittee Chair Art Torres reported regarding item 14.

(12) Eliminate the 50-employee cap.

The Little Hoover Commission recommended the elimination of the 50-employee cap in Proposition 71 in order to enhance CIRM’s administrative flexibility. Currently, CIRM is challenged by the 50-employee cap. CIRM staff is reviewing various options for addressing this challenge, but CIRM remains committed to the six percent cap on bonds funds for administrative expenditures.
Staff Position: CIRM staff recommends that CIRM review the options
available for addressing the challenge posed by the 50-employee cap.

(13) **Eliminate the 15-scientist cap on the GWG.**

The Little Hoover Commission recommended the elimination of the 15-
scientist cap on the Grants Working Group to expand CIRM's capacity to review grant
applications. However, elimination of the cap of 15 scientific GWG members/alternates
will not significantly affect the GWG's capacity to review more grant applications. The
real limiting factor for review is time. At a review meeting the GWG can only discuss
and score about 50 total applications per day for regular research grants and perhaps 15 to
20 for larger proposals such as Disease Teams or Training Grants. Increasing the number
of GWG members at a review will not speed up the rate at which each application is
reviewed. In fact, it may increase that review time to accommodate discussion by
additional members. Thus, regardless of the number of participating GWG members,
review of additional applications will require additional meeting days and increased
CIRM staff time to manage the reviews and write review summaries. CIRM staff
believes (based on comments from reviewers) that larger groups would be less focused
and engaged, and longer meetings would lead to reduced willingness to attend.

Staff Position: Because the 15-scientist cap on the GWG does not limit
CIRM’s capacity to review applications, CIRM staff does not support this proposal.

(14) **Require the CFAOC to conduct a performance review of CIRM.**

The Little Hoover Commission recommended expanding the authority of
the Citizens’ Financial Accountability Oversight Committee, which was created by
Proposition 71 to review CIRM’s annual independent financial audit and financial
practices, to include a performance audit of CIRM. Vice Chair Art Torres explained that
CIRM has already been subject to performance audits, including extensive audits
conducted by the Bureau of State Audits and the State Controller. He also stated that the
Legislature has authority to review CIRM's performance and added that CIRM’s
strategic scientific plan requires an independent panel of scientists to conduct a review of
CIRM’s performance in reaching the objectives outlined in the strategic plan. Given the
existing authority of the Legislature and the Controller to review CIRM’s performance
and the independent scientific review required by CIRM’s strategic plan, it is not
necessary to expand the CFAOC’s jurisdiction.

Vice-Chair’s Position: Because CIRM is already subject to
performance review, Vice Chair Torres recommends that CIRM should not support
this proposal.

C. **Legislative Subcommittee’s Proposed Position**

The Legislative Subcommittee engaged in a substantive discussion of the
Little Hoover Commission’s recommendations and staff’s analysis, took public comment,
and questioned staff of the Little Hoover Commission. The Legislative Subcommittee then approved, by a unanimous vote, a motion recommending that the Board endorse the staff’s positions on these items, as described above.

LEGISLATIVE SUBCOMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION: The Legislative Subcommittee recommends that the Board support the staff positions, as described above, on Little Hoover Commission recommendations 12 through 14.

CONCLUSION

The Legislative Subcommittee makes the following recommendations to the Board:

1. Oppose Little Hoover Commission recommendations 1 through 5 based on counsel’s advice that the proposed amendments to Proposition 71 would require another vote of the people.

2. Support the staff positions, as described above, on Little Hoover Commission recommendations 6 through 14.

3. Communicate CIRM’s position to the Legislature.

Attachments